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Abstract William Dembski (No free lunch: why speciﬁed complexity cannot be
purchased without intelligence, 2002) claimed that the NFL theorems from opti-
mization theory render darwinian biological evolution impossible. Ha ¨ggstro ¨m
(Biology and Philosophy 22:217–230, 2007) argued that the NFL theorems are not
relevant for biological evolution at all, since the assumptions of the NFL theorems
are not met. Although I agree with Ha ¨ggstro ¨m (Biology and Philosophy 22:217–
230, 2007), in this article I argue that the NFL theorems should be interpreted as
dealing with an extreme case within a much broader context. This broader context is
in fact relevant for scientiﬁc research of certain evolutionary processes; not in the
sense that the theorems can be used to draw conclusions about any intelligent design
inference, but in the sense that it helps us to interpret computer simulations of
evolutionary processes. As a result of this discussion, I will argue that from sim-
ulations, we do not learn much about how complexity arises in the universe. This
position is in contrast with certain claims in the literature that I will discuss.
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Introduction
The No Free Lunch Theorems (NFL theorems) were introduced in the biological
ﬁeld by William Dembski in his book No Free Lunch (2002), with the goal to show
that darwinian evolution is incapable of producing certain complex structures. In his
book (and elsewhere), Dembski then argues that these complex structures must have
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DOI 10.1007/s10539-008-9134-xbeen designed by some intelligence, thereby following Michael Behe’s best-selling
Darwin’s Black Box (1996). Dembski and Behe are two major ﬁgures in the
Intelligent Design (ID) movement; a movement which claims that nature bears the
unmistakable signs of intelligent design.
In this article, I will argue that the NFL theorems do play a role in the discussion
about evolution, albeit a somewhat different role than Dembski envisioned. This
does not imply that I defend ID in any way; I would like to emphasise this from the
outset. Indeed, I have criticized Dembski’s intelligent design inference in many
other publications before, see e.g. Meester (2003).
1 I certainly believe that we have
been produced by some evolutionary process, and this is precisely the reason that I
am very much interested in scientiﬁc research of biological evolutionary processes,
especially when my own discipline—mathematics and probability theory in
particular—comes into play. And mathematics comes into play very much as soon
as we make models of evolutionary processes and even more so when we simulate
such processes on a computer. Simulating evolution is a genuine branch of research,
with research papers doing only simulations making it to Nature; see for instance
Lenski et al. (2003) for a typical example to which I will return later in this article.
The (very reasonable) objections against any inference of intelligent design have
been so strong and emotional (see for instance Orr (2002) for a typical reaction), that
most people didn’t really take the trouble to think deeper about certain claims. In this
articlethen,IwanttoexplainwhyIthinkthattheNFLtheoremsgiverisetointeresting
considerationsconcerningtheinterpretationofsimulationsofevolutionaryprocesses,
without—of course—defending or making any intelligent design claim.
The article is built up as follows. First, I want to explain what the NFL theorems
say, and how this can be connected to evolutionary processes. I will illustrate the
NFL theorems with some toy-examples, to make the reader somewhat familiar with
their use, and also to anticipate the illustration of my point later on. I brieﬂy sketch
the reasoning of Dembski (2002) leading to his claim that these NFL theorems
disprove darwinian evolution. After that, I will summarise some of the ﬁndings of
Ha ¨ggstro ¨m( 2007), who convincingly showed that the NFL theorems themselves are
not relevant for biological evolution at all. However, I will put the NFL theorems into
a somewhat broader framework which is relevant for evolution. I will then argue that
this broader framework still has not much to say about the real evolution, but at the
same time, that it does say something about simulations of evolutionary processes.
Indeed, I will argue, based on the above mentioned broader framework, that
simulations can not tell us very much about the question whether or not darwinian
biological evolution is capable of creating complex features into the universe. This
position is in contrast with certain claims in the literature that I will discuss.
The NFL theorems; theory and some examples
A certain modest amount of mathematical notation is unavoidable in this section,
but I will make it as light as possible.
1 This publication is in Dutch.
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123Consider a ﬁnite set V and a function f : V ! R (the set of real numbers) which
assigns a real number to each element in V. Suppose we want to ﬁnd an element
x 2 V for which f(x) is maximal. This may seem like an easy problem, but typically,
V is extremely large, so a one by one search to ﬁnd an x 2 V with maximal value of
f(x) would take much too long.
2
Therefore, in optimization theory, one tries to set up some search algorithm to
ﬁnd an x 2 V that perhaps does not really maximize f(x), but for which f(x) is high in
a certain sense; for instance, one often tries to ﬁnd an x which satisﬁes f(x) C t, for
some given t. (See for instance Aarts and Lenstra (1997) for much more information
on algorithmic search.)
In our context, such algorithms have the following general form. Let f be a
function as above (very often, f is referred to as a ﬁtness function and we will adopt
this terminology), and deﬁne a target set T   V , say a set of the form T ¼f x 2
V : fðxÞ tg . First we choose an element x1 2 V according to some rule (not
involving the function f but possibly involving additional randomness) and we
compute f(x1). Given some rule that can only take into account x1 and f(x1) (and
additional randomness), another point x2 is chosen, different from x1, and f(x2)i s
computed. After k steps, we have k points x1;...;xk and in addition the values
fðx1Þ;...;fðxkÞ . The algorithm then goes on to choose a new point xk?1 which has
not been selected before, according to some rule that only involves x1;...;xk ,
fðx1Þ;...;fðxkÞ and possibly additional randomness. After that, f(xk?1) is computed,
et cetera.
If we choose the next point xk uniformly at random among all points that have not
been chosen before, that is, in such a way that each of the points not yet chosen have
equal probability to be chosen, then we call the resulting algorithm blind search, for
obvious reasons. Often though, the rule according to which one chooses the next xk
uses some structure of the set V. For instance, if V consists of pairs (k, l) for integers
k and l, then one could, for example, choose the next xk among neighbors of points
already chosen. Some examples follow soon.
The stage is now set for the NFL theorem (see Wolpert and Macready 1997).
3
They state that in a certain average sense, no search algorithm can be better than any
other. In their (and our) setting, the functions f are only allowed to take values in a
ﬁnite set S. Since also V is ﬁnite, there exist only ﬁnitely many functions f : V ! S ,
and the NFL theorem is concerned with a certain average over all these functions.
To formally state the result, let Ek be the event that at least one of the points
x1;...;xk falls into the target set T. When we take T ¼f x 2 V : fðxÞ tg , this boils
down to the event that at least one of the recorded values fðx1Þ;...;fðxkÞ has a value
at least t.
The NFL theorem Let pA,f be the probability of the event Ek when using the
function f and search algorithm A. When we average these numbers pA,f over all f,
the outcome is independent of the search algorithm A.
2 For instance, if V is the set of possible ways in which we can line up, say, 150 objects, then there is no
way in the world that we can ever calculate f(x) for every x [ V.
3 There are many similar results, but in what follows, we will be concerned with only one of them.
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better than any other at quickly ﬁnding a target set T. In particular, no search
algorithm is better than the blind search algorithm, in which the next xk is simply
chosen uniformly at random among all points that have not been chosen before. Put
in yet other words: we cannot expect a search algorithm to be efﬁcient unless we
restrict ourselves to functions f that are distinguishable from the ‘‘average‘‘ f, and I
believe that this last formulation is a concise description of the importance of the
NFL theorem.
Surprising as the result may sound at ﬁrst sight, the NFL theorem is in fact almost
a mathematical triviality once you see things from the right angle. I do not intend to
explain this here, and I refer to Ha ¨ggstro ¨m( 2007) for an excellent explanation as to
why this is the case.
Before we continue, let me very brieﬂy sketch why Dembski thinks that the NFL
theorem renders darwinian evolution impossible. It is fairly common to view
evolution as an algorithmic search procedure (see e.g. Dennett (1995)), or as an
optimization problem in which we want to maximize a ﬁtness function f which
assigns, for instance, a ﬁtness to each DNA sequence. The search consists of
changing the DNA sequence at certain locations, leading to a new element in the
space of DNA sequences (our space V). Since the ‘‘target set’’ of DNA sequences
which correspond to living organisms is extremely small compared to the total
number of DNA sequences, blind search will essentially never ﬁnd it. Therefore,
since according to the NFL theorem, no algorithm works better than blind search,
darwinian evolution is impossible, unless one ‘‘leads‘‘ the algorithm to the target set
by using a very special ﬁtness function or algorithm. This, however, would,
according to Dembski, be cheating since the search of such a special algorithm or
ﬁtness function would be at least as difﬁcult as the search for the target set itself in
the ﬁrst place. (Dembski coins this the displacement problem; see Dembski (2002),
Sect. 4.7.)
I do not disagree with Ha ¨ggstro ¨m concerning his criticism on this argument.
Indeed, it is simply not the case that a biological ﬁtness function can be viewed as
an average over all possible ﬁtness functions. Indeed, had this been the case, then a
simple mathematical argument shows that the ﬁtnesses of two DNA sequences
which differ in only one position, would have been completely independent of each
other, and this is clearly not the case.
4 Therefore the NFL theorem simply does not
apply.
This sounds as the end of the story, and if this were the case there was no need to
write the present paper. However, the story does not end here and in order to make
my point later, I will now ﬁrst discuss two simple examples of the NFL theorem in
action.
Example 1 Let V consist of only 3 points a, b and c. Suppose in addition that S
consist of 2 points, say 0 and 1. Then there are only 8 different functions from V to
S, which we can represent by the 8 triplets of 0’s and 1’s. We distinguish two
different search procedures A and B: A will be blind search, that is, each next point
4 See Ha ¨ggstro ¨m( 2007) for a full and detailed explanation of this claim.
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order a, b and c. We are interested in the probability that the search algorithm ﬁnds a
point x 2 V with f(x) = 1 in at most two steps. For the algorithms A and B we
denote these probabilities by pA,f and pB,f, respectively. In Table 1, we write all 8
functions f, together with the values of pA,f and pB,f. For instance on the second line,
blind search will ﬁnd the point c with probability 2/3, whereas under algorithm B,
the only point (namely c) where f takes the value 1, will not be found and hence the
0 in the last column. Note that although pA,f and pB,f are sometimes different for the
same f, the average value over all 8 functions is equal to 3/4 in both cases, in
accordance with the NFL theorem.
Example 2 Let V consist of all sequences of letters of the alphabet of length 3.
Consider one such sequence, for instance the word YES, and deﬁned a ﬁtness
function f : V ! R as follows: For any word abc 2 V; fðabcÞ¼1 if only the ﬁrst
letter matches with the word YES; fðabcÞ¼2 if only the second letter matches;
fðabcÞ¼4 if only the third letter matches. Furthermore, if two or more letters
match, we add the values of the matching letters. So for instance, f(FEW) = 2,
f(YEW) = 3, f(RES) = 6 and f(YES) = 7; the word YES maximizes this ﬁtness
function. This ﬁtness function is chosen in such a way that we can read off from its
value not only how many letters match with YES but also which ones. For instance,
if we have a word with ﬁtness 5, then we know that the ﬁrst and last letter match,
and the second letter does not.
Given this ﬁtness function, we can design a search algorithm that actually leads
us to the word YES (which has maximal ﬁtness 7) rather quickly. Indeed, if at some
moment in time, we have a word with ﬁtness 5 say, then we choose our next word
by ﬁxing the ﬁrst and third letter (since these are already correct), and choosing a
new second letter at random among all remaining possibilities that we have not been
seen before. In not too many steps we will end up with the word YES, having
maximal ﬁtness. Note that this algorithm uses the value of f at the current point,
unlike the algorithms of Example 1.
It is clear that there is nothing special about the word YES, and we can, by
choosing the appropriate ﬁtness function, direct a similar algorithm to any desirable
Table 1 The 8 functions,
together with pA,f and pB,f
Number f(a) f(b) f(c) pA,f pB,f
10 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 1 2/3 0
3 0 1 0 2/3 1
40 1 1 1 1
5 1 0 0 2/3 1
61 0 1 1 1
71 1 0 1 1
81 1 1 1 1
Average 3/4 3/4
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123ﬁnal outcome. If you use the ‘‘wrong‘‘ ﬁtness function, that is, not corresponding to
the target word, then you may never end up at the target. The NFL theorem asserts
that if you consider the collection of all ﬁtness functions with values in {0, 1, 2, 3, 4,
5, 6, 7} and average over all these functions, then the (average) probability to reach
a target with ﬁtness 7, say, does not depend on the precise algorithm we use.
How to interpret an (in)efﬁcient algorithm
Let us consider Example 1 again, and suppose that someone tries to locate a point in
V with ﬁtness 1 in at most two steps of a certain (unknown to us) search algorithm.
We know from the example that for any such search algorithm, on average (averaged
over all ﬁtness functions) the probability to be successful is 3/4. Now suppose
someone repeats the search many times, and as it turns out, he is successful every
time. What conclusion would we draw? Well, ﬁrst of all, we would conclude that this
person does not choose his ﬁtness function uniformly at random at each search, since
had he
5 done that, the success probability would have been 3/4. So we know that he
chooses his ﬁtness functions differently, although we do not really know how. He can
choose the same function each time, or choose a different one each time but not
according to a uniform distribution in which each function has equal probability of
being chosen. Let us for simplicity assume that he uses the same ﬁtness function all
the time, say the ﬁfth function given by f(a) = 1 and f(b) = f(c) = 0.
However, given that he uses this ﬁtness function, there is still freedom in the
search algorithm that he uses. In this particular example, it would be unwise to use
B, since then the success probability is only 2/3. No, if the ﬁfth ﬁtness function is
used, then the choice of the algorithm must be tailored around this choice in order
to get an efﬁcient algorithm. In the present example, algorithm B must have been
used in order to be successful every time. The point I want to make, then, is that it
will typically be the case that for a given (class of) ﬁtness function(s), different
algorithms will behave very differently, and one has to make the ‘‘correct‘‘ choice in
order to get an efﬁcient algorithm.
A similar reasoning applies to Example 2. If we ﬁnd that a certain researcher
ﬁnds the word YES over and over again, then we conclude that his algorithm is too
efﬁcient to be the result of averaging over all ﬁtness functions; it is not likely that he
chooses his ﬁtness function uniformly at random over all possibilities at the start of
each new search. No, it is reasonable to conclude that he uses the ﬁtness function
corresponding to the word YES, and that he uses the search algorithm associated to
that word. Again, note that the conclusion is two-fold: we know that he uses special
ﬁtness functions and we know that his search algorithm is tailored around this
choice in order to get an efﬁcient algorithm.
These remarks sound like very obvious ones, and in a way they are. Once a
search algorithm is more (or less, for that matter) efﬁcient than what you expect
from the NFL theorem, it must be the case that you use a special choice, or a special
class, of ﬁtness functions. But at the same time, you must use a careful choice of the
5 I use ‘‘he’’ where I strictly speaking should use ‘‘he or she’’.
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ﬁtness functions. The point is that if you average over all ﬁtness functions, then it
doesn’t matter which algorithm you take—this is precisely what the NFL theorem
says. But if you choose your ﬁtness function differently, then it does matter a lot
which algorithm you choose, as is illustrated by the examples above.
There is another way to look at this, as follows. The NFL theorem deals with a
situation in which we average over all ﬁtness functions. If we average, then it does
not matter at all which algorithm we use, that is what the theorem says. As such, the
theorem deals with an extreme situation: averaging over all ﬁtness functions. The
other extreme is that we ﬁx one speciﬁc ﬁtness function. In that case, as we saw
above, it matters a lot which algorithm one uses: only very special algorithms will
be efﬁcient in that case. Between these two extremes, numerous possibilities exist:
we may for instance look at a certain class of ﬁtness functions. It is not to be
expected that one can write down interesting general mathematical theorems for
these ‘‘intermediate’’ cases. Nevertheless, it is very reasonable to say that there is a
certain tendency which makes the choice of the algorithm more signiﬁcant when we
reduce the possibilities for our ﬁtness function.
So this is the conclusion that is connected to the NFL theorem (I emphasise that
this conclusion is not part of the mathematical theorem itself): when a certain
algorithm is efﬁcient in combination with a (class of) ﬁtness function(s), then the
algorithm must have been chosen very carefully. Note the similarity with what
Dembski called the ‘‘displacement problem‘‘, but also note the subtle but important
difference between his and my conclusion. I draw my conclusion from a broader
perspective in which the NFL theorems deals with one end of the spectrum only.
Application to evolution
What do we learn about evolution from this discussion? Let me ﬁrst make a general
remark about the role of mathematics in this context. Apart from the problems that
were noted by Ha ¨ggstro ¨m( 2007), the ideas in No Free Lunch suffer from a too
optimistic belief in the usefulness of mathematical models in biology (see also
Olofsson (2008) for a similar conclusion), and this remains true in the context of the
present article. The mathematical concepts that are used can of course be given a
biological interpretation; we already mentioned this before. Indeed, the space V can
be the space of DNA sequences (up to a certain length, say) and the ﬁtness function f
can—perhaps—be interpreted as a real ﬁtness function. But what about the search
algorithms? I do not think it is reasonable to summarise the extremely complex
biology (and chemistry, physics ...) that is associated to the process, into a single
search algorithm. There are no realistic models of evolution at the molecular level
that render this approach reasonable. Computing probabilities in a model is one
thing, but for these computations to have any implication, the models had better be
very good and accurate, and it is obvious that the various models do not live up to
this requirement. In particular, it is quite meaningless to compute the probability
that certain amino acids combine to produce a particular molecule, if there is no
realistic mathematical model (on the molecular level) around.
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framework, we distinguished between algorithms and ﬁtness functions; these
concepts exist more or less independently of each other. In real life, however, the
process itself and the space on which this process acts, do not exist independently of
each other. The evolutionary process itself generates DNA sequences which we took
as our space V before. This means that the evolutionary picture is not nearly as
simple and clear as suggested by Dembski, and I ﬁnd it hard to imagine how the
discussion in this article could apply directly to biology in any meaningful way.
This having said, I now want to argue that the algorithmic ‘‘NFL-way’’ of
thinking about evolution is very meaningful when it concerns computer simulations
of certain evolutionary processes. Unlike real evolution, computer simulations
sometimes ﬁt very well into the formal mathematical setting as discussed in this
article, and the discussion applies to such simulations directly.
Before discussing an important example in the literature, let me ﬁrst go back to
Example 2 above. Suppose we are confronted with a scientist who claims to obtain
the word YES over and over again. We can then be sure that the algorithm he uses is
the one corresponding to the word YES; it is the algorithm that was described in
detail in Example 2. It is hardly reasonable to say that when we simulate Example 2
on a computer, the process reached the ﬁnal outcome with highest ﬁtness by itself.
No, given the ﬁtness function (that is, given the word YES) the computer
programmer chose an efﬁcient algorithm that would lead to YES. In other words,
the programmer chose his program with insight in the future goal he wanted to
reach, and hence the simulation was intrinsically teleological.
Let us now look at a much more sophisticated example of the same type. In
Lenski et al. (2003), computer simulations are used to explain the evolutionary
origin of complex features. In their work, digital organisms—computer programs
that self-replicate, mutate and compete—evolve, and Lenski et al. wondered
whether the programs would eventually evolve into programs that can perform
certain logical operations. The ﬁtness of a program very much depends on the
operations it can handle. If at some point in time, a program can execute a given
logical operation, it is rewarded with an amount of ‘‘energy‘‘, which in this model
boils down to a certain amount of processing time; this can be seen as the ﬁtness of
the organism. Lenski et al. noted that this complex system of interacting
components produced (digital) organisms that could execute complicated logical
operations that were built from simpler ones, and that the organisms with the highest
ﬁtness evolved via organisms with low or intermediate ﬁtness. In the course of the
process, they observed variation, selection and heritability in their digital organisms,
very much analogous to the way evolution is supposed to work in real life. Some
solutions found by the process were even unanticipated by the researchers. This
made them draw the following conclusions:
These ﬁndings show how complex functions can originate by random
mutation and natural selection.
6
and
6 Lenski et al. (2003, p. 139).
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in evolutionary biology. They are particularly well suited to problems that are
difﬁcult to study with organic forms owing to incomplete information,
insufﬁcient time and the impracticality of experiments.
7
How reasonable are their conclusions? First of all, let me emphasise that their
article is a pleasure to read, and that I am very much impressed by the way they set
up the simulation. It is, from this point of view, an impressive piece of work. But
does their conclusion follow? To shed some light on this, let us discuss their
approach in the language of the present article.
First of all, their simulation is a search algorithm in our sense, with V being a
space of certain computer programs (their digital organisms). Furthermore, their
ﬁtness function is chosen in such a way that only a very small part of V has a high
ﬁtness; the target set is very special indeed. Finally, their simulation is set up with
the goal to show that the search algorithm can reach this very special target set of
digital organisms with high ﬁtness.
All this taken together means that this simulation is in the domain where the
discussion of the previous sections applies. It follows, therefore, that the target set
can only be reached if the search algorithm is very carefully tailored around their
ﬁtness function. And, of course, this tailoring is precisely what happened: many
program parameters must be ﬁxed, and it should be clear that most ‘‘version’’ of any
such algorithm would not produce anything interesting at all. In other words, it is
certainly not the case that one can say that the algorithm found a digital organism
with a high ﬁtness ‘‘by itself‘‘. The programming must have been done with insight
into the future goal that they wanted to reach.
Of course, not everything that was observed was actually designed by the
researchers. For instance, the researchers did not specify in advance what route
would be followed towards programs with a high ﬁtness. Also, as already mentioned
before, the researchers noted that unanticipated solutions were sometimes found by
the process. However, both these effect (the route not being controllable and the
emergence of unanticipated solutions) can already be observed in a toy example like
Example 2. Indeed, the actual path leading to the word YES is pretty much random
and uncontrollable; we know that we will eventually obtain the word YES but we do
not know—for instance—which of these three letters will be ﬁxed ﬁrst. And if we
would search for a word of ﬁtness 6, BES, say, then it is not a very big surprise that
in the process we might bump into the unique word YES of ﬁtness 7 along the
way—this will happen in a signiﬁcant fraction of the experiments.
Hence the careful choice of the algorithm does not—and should not, for that
matter—rule out unanticipated solutions and random routes towards these solutions.
Yet despite this, according to our earlier discussion, the algorithm in Lenski et al.
can only work if it is tailored carefully around their ﬁtness function, so the target
must have been set in advance (and—of course—this was the case). Indeed, if your
goal is sufﬁciently ‘‘special’’, that is, if your ﬁtness function assigns high ﬁtnesses to
a very small part of the full space of possibilities, then you cannot reach the target
7 Lenski et al. (2003, p. 143).
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around the NFL theorem in the previous sections forces this conclusion: if you reach
something ‘‘very special‘‘ in your simulations, then you must have programmed the
computer with insight in the future.
Let us now return to the two quoted conclusion in Lenski et al. Is it true that
‘‘these ﬁndings show how complex functions can originate by random mutation and
natural selection’’? Let me ﬁrst remark that this conclusion should be interpreted as
dealing with the real biological evolution, otherwise there does not seem to be a
point. Indeed, if your goal would be to explain why mutation and selection can
create complex features that you specify in advance, then the conclusion is clearly
correct and uncontroversial. But do these ﬁndings explain the ‘‘spontaneous’’
emergence of complex features in nature? I do not see how such an explanation
could possibly follow. The algorithm takes darwinian evolution as a starting point,
and it is (correctly) argued that variation, selection and heritability are enough to
reach a certain well-deﬁned and previously set target. However, the discussion
around the NFL theorem demonstrates that in a computer simulation which
constitutes a search algorithm, a ‘‘special’’ target can only be reached when you
carefully choose your algorithm around the target, that is, if the algorithm is
intrinsically teleological. And of course, darwinian evolution is not teleological, by
deﬁnition it cannot be! This conclusion does not imply that I do not believe in
darwinian evolution, but it does imply that computer simulations can not be used to
show how complex features arise in the universe.
Discussion, scope and conclusion
The above discussion only applies to simulations that constitute a search algorithm,
and which involve trying to reach a sufﬁciently special target set. Indeed, only in
these circumstances does the application of the NFL theorem lead to the conclusion
that the programming (that is, the choice of the algorithm) must have been done
with insight into the future. Needless to say, there are many simulations—also in an
evolutionary context—which do not fall into this category. For instance, it is
uncontroversial to use simulations to shed light on the development of antibiotic
resistance, or on how population genetics are affected by different geographical
structures and mating systems. Why is simulation not controversial in these cases?
Well, in the two examples just mentioned, the point is not to reach a special target,
but instead to compare the ‘‘typical‘‘ behavior of related systems. This means that
the problems related to the NFL theorem simply do not enter the scene. Simulations
in these circumstances are very useful, even though the results of such a simulation
are often quite predictable. Nevertheless, it sometimes happens that simulations
show unanticipated behavior, which forces one to think about what is going on.
Many evolutionary questions can be investigated with simulations when—for
instance—the mathematical models are too complicated for a rigorous mathematical
analysis, and they conﬁrm that the concept of darwinian evolution, with all its vital
ingredients, is a sensible one, and that it is a good thing to think about reality in
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on the question one wants to answer.
Let me phrase my point differently, just to make sure that I am not
misunderstood. I do not claim—of course—that a simulation can only be
meaningful if there is no design in the simulation. Indeed, it is impossible to
simulate without designing a program. Often this is no problem, but if the whole
point of your simulation is to show that complexity can arise in the universe in a
darwinian (and therefore non-teleological) way, then it does become a problem,
since then the above discussion applies and shows that any successful computer
program must be intrinsically teleological.
Let us now go back to the ﬁnal conclusion in Lenski et al. that (I repeat) ‘‘digital
organisms provide opportunities to address important issues in evolutionary biology.
They are particularly well suited to problems that are difﬁcult to study with organic
forms owing to incomplete information, insufﬁcient time and the impracticality of
experiments’’. It is hard to disagree with the statement itself, but again it is the
question as to what extent one is allowed to draw any conclusions about the real
emergence of complex features from these simulations. To put the conclusion in a
somewhat different style: if one wants to argue that there need not be any intelligent
design in nature, then it is hardly convincing that one argues by showing how a well-
designed and teleological algorithm behaves as real life is supposed to do. And I have
argued that any successful algorithm is necessarily teleological.
Hence, the ﬁnal conclusion can be formulated as follows: when we recognize the
NFL theorem as dealing with an extreme case within a much larger class of
situations, we see that in a search algorithm as deﬁned in the present article, a
sufﬁciently special target set can only be reached when the search algorithm is very
carefully tailored around the ﬁtness function. This conclusion is a direct
consequence of our discussion of the NFL theorems and beyond. This implies
that this special target can only be reached by programming with insight into the
future. Since darwinian evolution cannot look into the future, this forces us to
conclude that simulations can not be used for the purpose of explaining how
complex features arise into the universe. Certainly there are other evolutionary
problems which can be addressed with simulations in a non-controversial way, as
long as they are not concerned with reaching special targets by a search algorithm. I
think it is very important to be aware of this problem, so that we are able to better
interpret computer simulations for evolutionary problems in the future.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
Noncommercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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